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Introduction: The Growing Impact of Youth Detention
Despite the lowest youth crime rates in 20 years, hundreds of thousands of young 
people are locked away every year in the nation’s 591 secure detention centers. 
Detention centers are intended to temporarily house youth who pose a high risk of 
re-offending before their trial, or who are deemed likely to not appear for their trial. 
But the nation’s use of detention is steadily rising, and facilities are packed with young 
people who do not meet those high-risk criteria—about 70 percent are detained for 
nonviolent offenses.2
“Detention: A form of locked custody of youth pre-trial who are arrested—
juvenile detention centers are the juvenile justice system’s version of 
“jail,” in which most young people are being held before the court has 
judged them delinquent. Some youth in detention are there because they 
fail the conditions of their probation or parole, or they may be waiting 
in detention before their ﬁnal disposition (i.e. sentence to a community 
program, or juvenile correctional facility).”3
The increased and unnecessary use of secure detention exposes troubled young 
people to an environment that more closely resembles adult prisons and jails than 
the kinds of community and family-based interventions proven to be most effective. 
Detention centers, said a former Deputy Mayor of New York of that city’s infamous 
Spofford facility, are “indistinguishable from a prison.”4 Commenting on New York’s 
detention centers, one Supreme Court Justice said that, “fairly viewed, pretrial 
detention of a juvenile gives rise to injuries comparable to those associated with the 
imprisonment of an adult.”5
Detained youth, who are frequently pre-adjudication and awaiting their court date, 
or sometimes waiting for their placement in another facility or community-based 
program, can spend anywhere from a few days to a few months in locked custody. At 
best, detained youth are physically and emotionally separated from the families and 
communities who are the most invested in their recovery and success. Often, detained 
youth are housed in overcrowded, understaffed facilities—an environment that conspires 
to breed neglect and violence. 
A recent literature reviewi of youth corrections shows that detention has a profoundly 
negative impact on young people’s mental and physical well-being, their education, 
and their employment. One psychologist found that for one-third of incarcerated youth 
diagnosed with depression, the onset of the depression occurred after they began their 
incarceration,6 and another suggests that poor mental health, and the conditions of 
conﬁnement together conspire to make it more likely that incarcerated teens will engage 
in suicide and self-harm.7 Economists have shown that the process of incarcerating youth 
will reduce their future earnings and their ability to remain in the workforce, and could 
change formerly detained youth into less stable employees. Educational researchers 
have found that upwards of 40 percent of incarcerated youth have a learning disability, 
and they will face signiﬁcant challenges returning to school after they leave detention. 
Most importantly, for a variety of reasons to be explored, there is credible and signiﬁcant 
research that suggests that the experience of detention may make it more likely that 
“[F]airly viewed, 
pretrial detention of a 
juvenile gives rise to 
injuries comparable to 
those associated with 
the imprisonment of 
an adult.”
–Justice Marshall for 
the minority in Schall v. 
Martin, 1984.
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youth will continue to engage in delinquent behavior, and that the detention experience 
may increase the odds that youth will recidivate, further compromising public safety.
Detention centers do serve a role by temporarily supervising the most at-risk youth. 
However, with 70 percent being held for nonviolent offenses, it is not clear whether 
the mass detention of youth is necessary—or being borne equally. While youth of 
color represent about a third of the youth population, the latest ﬁgures show that they 
represent 61 percent of detained youth.9 Youth of color are disproportionately detained at 
higher rates than whites, even when they engage in delinquent behavior at similar rates 
as white youth. 
This policy brief looks at the consequences of detention on young people, their families, 
and communities. This policy brief shows that, given the new ﬁndings that detaining 
youth may not make communities safer, the costs of needlessly detaining young people 
who do not need to be there are simply too high. Policymakers, instead, should look to 
detention reform as a means to reduce the number of young people needlessly detained, 
and reinvest the savings in juvenile interventions proven to reduce recidivism and crime, 
and that can help build healthy and safe communities.
Each year it is 
estimated that 
approximately 500,000 
youth are brought 
to juvenile detention 
centers. On any given 
day more than 26,000 
youth are detained.8
i  This policy brief brings together the best existing literature on the efﬁcacy and impact of detention, and also examines the reported outcomes of incarcerating juveniles in 
secure, congregate detention facilities in order to provide practitioners and policymakers with a deeper understanding of “the dangers” of overusing detention. Some of the 
ﬁndings reported here are the result of research conducted on youth and young adults in facilities or programs outside of juvenile detention facilities. The implications and 
conclusion drawn from research outside of detention centers proper is worthy of consideration: detention is usually the ﬁrst form of congregate institutional conﬁnement 
that youth falling under the authority of juvenile justice agencies will experience, and like residential or adult correctional or pretrial institutions, it is reasonable to infer 
that the impact of other kinds of incarceration and secure, congregate facilities do apply to the detention experiences. Every attempt has been made to accurately portray 
the population that the cited authors were studying, and the environment in which the study was conducted—generally, we referred to “detention” when the youth were 
detained, and “incarceration” when they were somewhere else.
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The Impact of Detention 
on Crime, Rehabilitation, and Public Safety
Detention can increase recidivism
Instead of reducing crime, the act of incarcerating high numbers of youth may in fact 
facilitate increased crime by aggravating the recidivism of youth who are detained. 
A recent evaluation of secure detention in Wisconsin, conducted by the state’s Joint 
Legislative Audit Committee reported that, in the four counties studied, 70 percent of 
youth held in secure detention were arrested or returned to secure detention within one 
year of release.10 The researchers found that “placement in secure detention may deter 
a small proportion of juveniles from future criminal activity, although they do not deter 
most juveniles.”
Prior Incarceration was a Greater Predictor of Recidivism than 
Carrying a Weapon, Gang Membership, or Poor Parental Relationship
 
Source: Benda, B.B. and Tollet, C.L. (1999), “A Study of Recidivism of Serious 
and Persistent Offenders Among Adolescents.” Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 27, No. 2 111-126.
Studies on Arkansas’ incarcerated youth11 found not only a high recidivism rate for 
incarcerated young people, but that the experience of incarceration is the most 
signiﬁcant factor in increasing the odds of recidivism. Sixty percent of the youth 
studied were returned to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) within three years. 
The most signiﬁcant predictor of recidivism was prior commitment; the odds of 
returning to DYS increased 13.5 times for youth with a prior commitment. Among 
the youth incarcerated in Arkansas, two-thirds were conﬁned for nonviolent offenses. 
Similarly, the crimes that landed the serious offenders under the supervision of adult 
corrections were overwhelmingly nonviolent—less than 20 percent were crimes 
against persons.
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Congregating delinquent youth together negatively affects their behavior 
and increases their chance of re-offending
Behavioral scientists are ﬁnding that bringing youth together for treatment or services 
may make it more likely that they will become engaged in delinquent behavior. Nowhere 
are deviant youth brought together in greater numbers and density than in detention 
centers, training schools, and other conﬁned congregate “care” institutions.
Researchers at the Oregon Social Learning Center found that congregating youth 
together for treatment in a group setting causes them to have a higher recidivism 
rate and poorer outcomes than youth who are not grouped together for treatment. 
The researchers call this process “peer deviancy training,” and reported statistically 
signiﬁcant higher levels of substance abuse, school difﬁculties, delinquency, violence, 
and adjustment difﬁculties in adulthood for those youth treated in a peer group setting. 
The researchers found that “unintended consequences of grouping children at-risk 
for externalizing disorders may include negative changes in attitudes toward antisocial 
behavior, afﬁliation with antisocial peers, and identiﬁcation with deviancy.”12
Detention pulls youth deeper into the juvenile and criminal justice system
Similar to the comment by the San Jose police chief, studies have shown that once 
young people are detained, even when controlling for their prior offenses, they are more 
likely than non-detained youth to end up going “deeper” into the system; these studies 
show that detained youth are more likely to be referred to court, see their case progress 
through the system to adjudication and disposition, have a formal disposition ﬁled against 
them, and receive a more serious disposition.
 
Source: Frazier, C.E. and Cochran, J.K. (1986) Detention of Juveniles: Its Effects on Subsequent Juvenile Court Processing and Decisions. Youth 
and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3, March 1986, p. 286-305 (N=9,317; p=.05)
A study done in Florida in the late 1980s found that, when controlling for other key 
variables such as age, race, gender, and offense severity, detained youth faced a greater 
probability of having a petition ﬁled at intake (6.2 percent), a greater probability for having 
a petition ﬁled by the State Attorney (9 percent), and a greater probability of receiving 
formal judicial interventions (8.5 percent) than youth not detained. Another study in 
Florida by the Ofﬁce of State Court Administrators found that when controlling for other 
factors—including severity of offense—youth who are detained are three times more 
likely to end up being committed to a juvenile facility than similar youth who are not 
detained.14
“Locking up kids is the 
easiest way. But once 
they get in the juvenile 
justice system, it’s very 
hard to get them out.”
 
—San Jose Police Chief 
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Alternatives to detention can curb crime and recidivism better than detention
Several studies have shown that youth who are incarcerated are more likely to recidivate 
than youth who are supervised in a community-based setting, or not detained at all. 
Young people in San Francisco’s Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, for example, 
have about half the recidivism rate of young people who remained in detention or in the 
juvenile justice system.15
Source: Sheldon, R.G. (1999), “Detention Diversion Advocacy: An Evaluation.” Juvenile Justice Bulletin 
Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(DDAP n=271; Comparison n=271)
Research from Texas suggests that young people in community-based placements are 14 
percent less likely to commit future crimes than youth that have been incarcerated.16
Detention can slow or interrupt 
the natural process of “aging out of delinquency”
Many young people in fact engage in “delinquent” behavior, but despite high 
incarceration rates, not all youth are detained for delinquency. Dr. Delbert Elliott, 
former President of the American Society of Criminology and head of the Center for 
the Study of the Prevention of Violence has shown that as many as a third of young 
people will engage in delinquent behavior17 before they grow up but will naturally “age 
out” of the delinquent behavior of their younger years. While this rate of delinquency 
among young males may seem high, the rate at which they end their criminal behavior, 
(called the “desistance rate”) is equally high.18 Most youth will desist from delinquency 
on their own. For those who have more trouble, Elliott has shown that establishing 
a relationship with a signiﬁcant other (a partner or mentor) as well as employment 
correlates with youthful offenders of all races “aging out” of delinquent behavior as 
they reach young adulthood.
Research from Florida 
shows that when 
controlling for other 
factors, youth who 
are detained are 
three times more 
likely to end up being 
committed to a juvenile 
facility than similar 
youth who are not 
detained.
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Most Young People Age Out of Crime on Their Own
Source: FBI Crime in the United States (1993).
Whether a youth is detained or not for minor delinquency has lasting ramiﬁcations for 
that youth’s future behavior and opportunities. Carnegie Mellon researchers have shown 
that incarcerating juveniles may actually interrupt and delay the normal pattern of “aging 
out” since detention disrupts their natural engagement with families, school, and work.19 
There is little relationship between 
detention and overall crime in the community
While there may be an individual need to incarcerate some high-risk youth, the mass 
detention of a half-million youth each year is not necessarily reducing crime.
During the ﬁrst part of the 1990s, as juvenile arrests rose, the use of detention rose 
far faster (See table, “Different Directions”). By the middle of the 1990s, as juvenile 
arrests began to plummet (and the number of youth aged 10-17 leveled off), the use of 
detention continued to rise. In other words, while there may be some youth who need 
to be detained to protect themselves, or the public, there is little observed relationship 
between the increased use of detention, and crime.
Different Directions: 
Detention Populations vs. Arrest Rates for U.S. Juveniles in the 1990s
There is little observed 
relationship between 
the increased use of 
detention, and crime.
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Sources: Detention data adapted
from Sickmund, M. (forthcoming).
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Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention;
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To the contrary, several communities ranging from the Western United States (Santa 
Cruz, California and Portland, Oregon) to one of the nation’s biggest urban centers 
(Chicago, Illinois) have found ways to both reduce detention and reduce crime, better 
serving the interests of youth development and public safety. Between 1996 and 
2002, violent juvenile arrests in the country fell by 37 percent; Santa Cruz matched that 
decline (38 percent), and Portland and Chicago exceeded it (45 percent and 54 percent, 
respectively).20 And during roughly the same time, juvenile detention populations fell 
between 27 and 65 percent in those jurisdictions.
The Impact of Detention on Young People’s 
Mental Health, and Propensity to Self-Harm.
Of all the various health needs that detention administrators identify among the youth 
they see, unmet mental and behavioral health needs rise to the top. While researchers 
estimate that upwards of two-thirds of young people in detention centers could meet 
the criteria for having a mental disorder, a little more than a third need ongoing clinical 
care—a ﬁgure twice the rate of the general adolescent population.22
Why is the prevalence of mental illness among detained youth so high? First, detention has 
become a new “dumping ground” for young people with mental health issues. One Harvard 
academic theorizes that the trauma associated with the rising violence in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in some urban centers had a deep and sustained impact on young people. At the 
same time, new laws were enacted that reduced judicial discretion to decide if youth would 
be detained, decreasing the system’s ability to screen out and divert youth with disorders. All 
the while, public community youth mental health systems deteriorated during this decade, 
leaving detention as the “dumping ground” for mentally ill youth.
Detention makes mentally ill youth worse
Another reason for the rise in the prevalence of mental illness in detention is that the 
kind of environment generated in the nation’s detention centers, and the conditions of 
that conﬁnement, conspire to create an unhealthy environment. Researchers have found 
that at least a third of detention centers are overcrowded,23 breeding an environment 
of violence and chaos for young people. Far from receiving effective treatment, young 
people with behavioral health problems simply get worse in detention, not better. 
Research published in Psychiatry Resources showed that for one-third of incarcerated 
youth diagnosed with depression, the onset of the depression occurred after they began 
their incarceration.24 “The transition into incarceration itself,” wrote one researcher in the 
medical journal, Pediatrics, “may be responsible for some of the observed [increased 
mental illness in detention] effect.”25 
An analysis published in the Journal of Juvenile Justice and Detention Services suggests 
that poor mental health and the conditions of detention conspire together to generate 
higher rates of depression and suicide idealization:26 24 percent of detained Oregon 
youth were found to have had suicidal ideations over a seven-day period, with 34 percent 
of the youth suffering from “a current signiﬁcant clinical level of depression.”
An indicator of the shift was spelled out by a 2004 Special Investigations Division Report 
of the U.S. House of Representatives, which found that two-thirds of juvenile detention 
facilities were holding youth who were waiting for community mental health treatment, 
and that on any given night, 7 percent of all the youth held in detention were waiting for 
community mental health services. As one detention administrator told Congress, “we 
are receiving juveniles that 5 years ago would have been in an inpatient mental health 
facility. . . [W]e have had a number of juveniles who should no more be in our institution 
than I should be able to ﬂy.”27
Researchers believe 
that the combination of 
mental health disorders 
youth bring into 
detention coupled with 
the negative effects 
of institutionalization 
places incarcerated 
youth at a higher risk 
of suicide than other 
youth.21
A Washington state 
detention administrator 
interviewed by 
the U.S. House of 
Representatives said, 
“We are receiving 
juveniles that ﬁve years 
ago would have been 
in an inpatient mental 
health facility. . . . [W]e 
have had a number of 
juveniles who should 
no more be in our 
institution than I should 
be able to ﬂy.”
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Detention puts youth at greater risk of self-harm
While some researchers have found that the rate of suicide in juvenile institutions is 
about the same as the community at large,28 others have found that incarcerated youth 
experience from double to four times the suicide rate of youth in community.29 The 
Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reports that 11,000 youth engage 
in more than 17,000 acts of suicidal behavior in the juvenile justice system annually.30 
Another monograph published by OJJDP found that juvenile correctional facilities often 
incorporate responses to suicidal threats and behavior in ways that endanger the youth 
further, such as placing the youth in isolation.31
The Impact of Detention on the Education of Detained Youth
Detained youth with special needs fail to return to school
Juvenile detention interrupts young people’s education, and once incarcerated, some 
youth have a hard time returning to school. A Department of Education study showed 
that 43 percent of incarcerated youth receiving remedial education services in detention 
did not return to school after release, and another 16 percent enrolled in school but 
dropped out after only ﬁve months.32 Another researcher found that most incarcerated 
9th graders return to school after incarceration but within a year of re-enrolling two-thirds 
to three-fourths withdraw or drop out of school: After four years, less than 15 percent of 
these incarcerated 9th graders had completed their secondary education.33
 
Source: LeBlanc, (1991), “Unlocking Learning” in Correctional Facilities. Washington, D.C. Department of Education.
Young people who leave detention and who do not reattach to schools face collateral 
risks: High school dropouts face higher unemployment, poorer health (and a shorter 
life), and earn substantially less than youth who do successfully return and complete 
school.34 The failure of detained youth to return to school also affects public safety. The 
U.S. Department of Education reports that dropouts are 3.5 times more likely than high 
school graduates to be arrested.35 The National Longitudinal Transition Study reveals that 
approximately 20 percent of all adolescents with disabilities had been arrested after 
being out of school for two years.36
 
The Impact of Detention on Employment
Formerly detained youth have reduced success in the labor market
If detention disrupts educational attainment, it logically follows that detention will also impact 
the employment opportunities for youth as they spiral down a different direction from their 
In one study, 43 
percent of incarcerated 
youth receiving 
remedial education 
services did not return 
to school after release. 
Another 16 percent 
enrolled in school but 
dropped out after only 
5 months.
 
Incarcerated youth who received
education while incarcerated
re-enrolled in school, but dropped
out 5 months later 16%
Incarcerated youth who received
education while incarcerated
but did not re-enroll in school 43%
Detention May Affect Youth’s Ability
to Re-enroll in School
Other
41%
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non-detained peers. A growing number of studies show that incarcerating young people has 
signiﬁcant immediate and long-term negative employment and economic outcomes. 
A study done by academics with the National Bureau of Economic Research found that 
jailing youth (age 16-25) reduced work time over the next decade by 25-30 percent.37 
Looking at youth age 14 to 24, Princeton University researchers found that youth who 
spent some time incarcerated in a youth facility experienced three weeks less work a 
year (for African-American youth, ﬁve weeks less work a year) as compared to youth who 
had no history of incarceration.38
Source: Western, Bruce and Beckett, Katherine (1999), “How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market?: The Penal System as a Labor Market 
Institution,” The American Journal of Sociology, 104: 1030-1060.
Due to the disruptions in their education, and the natural life processes that allow young 
people to “age-out” of crime, one researcher posits, “the process of incarceration could 
actually change an individual into a less stable employee.”39
A monograph published by the National Bureau of Economic Research has shown that 
incarcerating large numbers of young people seems to have a negative effect on the 
economic well-being of their communities. Places that rely most heavily on incarceration 
reduce the employment opportunities in their communities compared to places that deal 
with crime by means other than incarceration. “Areas with the most rapidly rising rates 
of incarceration are areas in which youths, particularly African-American youths, have had 
the worst earnings and employment experience.”40
The loss of potentially stable employees and workers—and of course, county, state, 
and federal taxpayers—is one of numerous invisible costs that the overuse of detention 
imposes on the country and on individual communities.
The Larger Economic Impact of Detention on Communities
Detention is expensive— 
more expensive than alternatives to detention
The ﬁscal costs of incarcerating youth are a cause for concern in these budget-strained 
times. According to Earl Dunlap, head of the National Juvenile Detention Association, 
the annual average cost per year of a detention bed—depending on geography and cost 
of living—could range from $32,000 ($87 per day) to as high as $65,000 a year ($178 
per day), with some big cities paying far more. Dunlap says that the cost of building, 
ﬁnancing, and operating a single detention bed costs the public between $1.25 and $1.5 
million over a twenty-year period of time.41
“Having been in jail 
is the single most 
important deterrent 
to employment...the 
effect of incarceration 
on employment years 
later [is] substantial and 
signiﬁcant,” according 
to the National Bureau 
of Economic Research.
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By contrast, a number of communities that have invested in alternatives to detention have 
documented the ﬁscal savings they achieve on a daily basis, in contrast to what they would 
spend per day on detaining a youth. In New York City (2001), one day in detention ($385) 
costs 15 times what it does to send a youth to a detention alternative ($25).42 In Tarrant 
County, Texas (2004), it costs a community 3.5 times as much to detain a youth per day 
($121) versus a detention alternative ($35), and even less for electronic monitoring ($3.75).43
Detention is not cost effective
Whether compared to alternatives in the here and now, or put to rigorous economic 
efﬁciency models that account for the long-term costs of crime and incarceration 
overtime, juvenile detention is not a cost-effective way of promoting public safety, or 
meeting detained young people’s needs. 
The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), a non-partisan research institution 
that—at legislative direction—studies issues of importance to Washington State, was 
directed to study the cost effectiveness of the state’s juvenile justice system. WSIPP 
found that there had been a 43 percent increase in juvenile justice spending during the 
1990s, and that the main factor driving those expenditures was the conﬁnement of juvenile 
offenders. While this increase in spending and juvenile incarceration was associated with a 
decrease in juvenile crime, WSIPP found, “the effect of detention on lower crime rates has 
decreased in recent years as the system expanded. The lesson: conﬁnement works, but it 
is an expensive way to lower crime rates.”44 The legislature directed them to take the next 
step, and answer the question, “Are there less expensive ways to reduce juvenile crime?”
WSIPP found that, for every dollar spent on county juvenile detention systems, $1.98 of 
“beneﬁts” in terms of reduced crime and costs of crime to taxpayers was achieved. By 
sharp contrast, diversion and mentoring programs produced $3.36 of beneﬁts for every 
dollar spent, aggression replacement training produced $10 of beneﬁts for every dollar 
spent, and multi-systemic therapy produced $13 of beneﬁts for every dollar spent. Any 
inefﬁciencies in a juvenile justice system that concentrates juvenile justice spending on 
detention or conﬁnement drains available funds away from interventions that may be 
more effective at reducing recidivism and promoting public safety.
Source: Aos, S. (2002), The Juvenile Justice System in Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness. Olympia, Washington: 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy.
Given the ﬁnding by the Journal of Qualitative Criminology that the cost of a youth 
offender’s crimes and incarceration over their lifetime (including adult) can cost as much 
as $1.7 million,45 a front-end investment in interventions proven to help young people 
would seem to be more effective public safety spending.
“It is quite reasonable 
to suggest that a single 
detention bed costs 
the public between 
$1.25 and $1.5 million 
over a twenty-year 
period of time.”
—Earl Dunlap, CEO, 
National Juvenile 
Detention Association
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 The rise of youth detention: policy or politics?
With falling youth crime rates, and a growing body of research that shows that 
alternatives are less expensive and more effective than detention, why do we continue to 
spend valuable resources building more locked facilities to detain low-risk youth?
Similar to the fate of the adult criminal justice system, the traditional mission of the 
juvenile justice system has been altered by the politicization of crime policy in this 
country.
 At the turn of the century, when reformers developed the nation’s ﬁrst juvenile court 
in Chicago, Illinois, they set up a separate system for youth to meet the needs of 
adolescents, acknowledging that youth have different levels of culpability and capacity 
than adults. They also believed that youth deserved a second chance at rehabilitation. 
Within 30 years, every state in the nation had a juvenile court system based on the 
premise that young people were developmentally different than adults. 
But the “tough-on-crime” concerns of the 1990s changed the priorities and orientation 
of the juvenile justice system. Rising warnings of youth “superpredators,” “school 
shootings,” and the ampliﬁcation of serious episodes of juvenile crime in the biggest 
cities fueled political momentum to make the system “tougher” on kids. By the end 
of the 1990s, every state in the nation had changed their laws in some way to make 
it easier to incarcerate youth in the adult system. As many states made their juvenile 
justice systems more punitive, the courts made more zealous use of detention.
The rise of youth detention borne by youth of color
The rapid expansion of the use of juvenile detention has hit some communities 
harder than others. From 1985 to 1995, the number of youth held in secure detention 
nationwide increased by 72 percent. But during this time, the proportion of white youth 
in detention actually dropped, while youth of color came to represent a majority of the 
young people detained. The detained white youth population increased by 21 percent, 
while the detained minority youth population grew by 76 percent. By 1997, in 30 out of 
50 states (which contain 83 percent of the U.S. population) minority youth represented 
the majority of youth in detention.46 Even in states with tiny ethnic and racial minority 
populations, (like Minnesota, where the general population is 90 percent white, and 
Pennsylvania, where the general population is 85 percent white) more than half of the 
detention population are youth of color. In 1997, OJJDP found that in every state in 
the country (with the exception of Vermont), the minority population of detained youth 
exceeded their proportion in the general population.47
The latest ﬁgures show that the shift in the demographics of detention that occurred 
during the 1980s and 1990s continues today: In 2003 African-American youth were 
detained at a rate 4.5 higher than whites; and Latino youth were detained at twice the 
rate of whites. Minority youth represented 61 percent of all youth detained in 2003.48
By the end of the 
1990s, the system 
became more punitive, 
and every state in the 
nation had changed 
their laws in some way 
to make it easier to 
incarcerate youth in the 
adult system. An adult 
charge often means a 
young person must be 
held pre-trial in either a 
detention center or an 
adult jail.
“The effect of detention 
on lower crime rates 
has decreased in recent 
years as the system 
expanded... it is an 
expensive way to lower 
crime rates.”
 
—Washington State 
Institute for Public 
Policy 
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Source: Sickmund, Melissa, Sladky, T.J., and Kang, Wei (2004), 
“Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook,” http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/cjrp/. 
The greatest levels of racial disparity in the use of detention are found in the least serious 
offense categories. For example, surveys from the late 1990s found that whites used and 
sold drugs at rates similar to other races and ethnicities, but that African Americans were 
detained for drug offenses at more than twice rate of whites.49 White youth self-reported 
using heroin and cocaine at 6 times the rate of African-American youth, but African-
American youth are almost three times as likely to be arrested for a drug crime.50 On 
any given day, African Americans comprise nearly half of all youth in the United States 
detained for a drug offense.51
The causes of the disproportionate detention of youth of color are rooted in some of the 
nation’s deepest social problems, many of which may play out in key decision-making 
points in the juvenile justice system. 
While white youth 
and minority youth 
commit several 
categories of crime 
at the same rate, 
minority youth are 
more likely to be 
arrested.
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While white youth and minority youth commit several categories of crime at the same 
rate, minority youth are more likely to be arrested. Once arrested, white youth tend to have 
access to better legal representation and programs and services than minority youth.
People involved in the decision to detain a youth may bring stereotypes to their 
decision. One study shows that people charged with the decision of holding youth 
prior to adjudication are more likely to say a white youth’s crimes are a product of their 
environment (i.e. a broken home), while an African-American youth’s delinquency is 
caused by personal failings—even when youth of different races are arrested for similar 
offenses and have similar offense histories.52
A Better Way: 
Juvenile Detention Reforms Taking Hold Across the Nation
The way to reduce the impact of detention on young people is to reduce the number 
of youth needlessly or inappropriately detained. The Juvenile Detention Alternatives 
Initiative (JDAI) is a response to the inappropriate and unnecessary detention of youth 
in the nation’s juvenile justice systems. JDAI is a public-private partnership being 
implemented nationwide; pioneering jurisdictions include Santa Cruz County, California 
Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon; Bernalillo County (Albuquerque), New Mexico; 
and Cook County (Chicago), Illinois. 
JDAI is a process, not a conventional program, whose goal is to make sure that locked 
detention is used only when necessary. In pursuing that goal, JDAI restructures the 
surrounding systems to create improvements that reach far beyond detention alone. 
To achieve reductions in detention populations, the JDAI model developed a series of 
core strategies, which include:
•  Inter-governmental collaboration: bringing together the key actors in the 
juvenile justice system—especially courts, probation, and the police—as well as 
actors outside the justice system such as schools and mental health.
•  Reliance on data: beginning with data collection and leading to continuous 
analysis of data as well as the cultural expectation that decisions will be based on 
information and results.
•  Objective admissions screening: developing risk assessment instruments and 
changing procedures so they are always used to guide detention decisions.
•  Alternatives to secure conﬁnement: creating programs and services in the 
community to ensure appearance and good behavior pending disposition, and to be 
available as an option at sentencing.
•  Expedited case processing: to move cases along so youth don’t languish in 
detention for unnecessarily long time periods.
•  Improved handling of “special cases”: Youth who are detained for technical 
probation violations, outstanding warrants, and youth pending services or placement 
create special management problems and need special approaches.
•  Express strategies to reduce racial disparities: “good government” reforms 
alone do not eliminate disparities; speciﬁc attention is needed to achieve this goal.
•  Improving conditions of conﬁnement: to ensure that the smaller number of 
youth who still require secure detention are treated safely, legally, and humanely.
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The way to reduce the 
impact of detention is 
to reduce the number 
of youth needlessly 
or inappropriately 
detained.
The fundamental measure of JDAI’s success is straightforward: a reduction in the 
number of youth conﬁned on any day and admitted to detention over the course of a 
year, and a reduction in the number of young people exposed to the dangers inherent in 
a detention stay.
Detention Reform Decreases Detention Populations:
Admissions Impact of JDAI on Select Sites.
County Average Daily Population Annual Admissions
Pre-JDAI 2003 Pre-JDAI 2003
Cook 623 454 (-27.1%) 7,438 6,396(-14.0%)
Multnomah 96 33 (-65.6%) 2,915 348 (-88.1%)
Santa Cruz 47 27 (-42.6%) 1,591 972 (-38.9%)
Source: Cook County, Multnomah, and Santa Cruz Probation Departments.
Decreasing the use of detention has not jeopardized public safety. In the counties 
implementing JDAI, juvenile crime rates fell as much as, or more than, national 
decreases in juvenile crime. These communities have also experienced an improvement 
in the number of young people who appear in court after they have been released from 
detention, further reducing the need for detention.
Detention Reform Coincides with Crime Declines, 
and Failure to Appear Rates Fall.
County Violent Juvenile Arrest Rate Failure to Appear
(1996-2002) Pre-JDAI 2003
Cook -54% 39% 13%(-66.7%)
Multnomah -45% 7% 7%
Santa Cruz -38% N/A 3%
United States 
Average
-37%
Source: Uniform Crime Report, Crime in the United States Survey (1996; 2002); Cook County, Multnomah and Santa Cruz Probation Departments
Like the impact of detention—which can extend beyond the walls of the locked facility—
reducing detention populations inﬂuences the entire juvenile justice system. In Cook 
County, the number of youth sent from local detention to state prison beds declined 
from 902 in 1997 to 498 in 2003, at average annual savings of $23,000 per bed.53 In 
addition, more kids who rotated through the juvenile justice system re-enrolled in school 
and obtained scholarships for college.
Cities and counties engaged in detention reform also note their progress by their 
acceptance in the community. Cook County engaged system kids and their parents 
for advice about how to improve the system, and persevered (and supported the staff) 
through some daunting complaints. In the aftermath, the probation department adjusted 
its ofﬁce hours and locations, changed the way it communicated with clients and their 
families, and institutionalized feedback mechanisms. Now community members are 
genuinely engaged in decisions including policy formulation, program development, and 
even hiring. It is not a formal measure, but it leads to improved services and priceless 
levels of respect and engagement in the community.
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A better future: invest juvenile justice funds in programs proven to work
If detention reform is successful, communities should be able to reinvest the funds once 
spent on detention beds and new detention centers in other youth-serving systems, or 
other interventions proven to reduce recidivism. 
The Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, the Ofﬁce of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, the Washington State Institute for Public Policy, and a plethora 
of other research institutes have shown that several programs and initiatives are proven 
to reduce recidivism and crime in a cost-effective matter. Some common elements in 
proven programs include:
•  Treatment occurs with their family, or in a family-like setting
•  Treatment occurs at home, or close to home
•  Services are delivered in a culturally respectful and competent manner
•  Treatment is built around the youth and family strengths
•  A wide range of services and resources are delivered to the youth, as well as their 
families.
Most of these successful programs are designed to serve the needs of youth in family-
like settings, situated as close to home as possible with services delivered in a culturally 
sensitive and competent manner. 
These proven programs identify the various aspects of a youth—their strengths and 
weaknesses as well as the strengths and resources of their families and communities. 
Progress is based on realistic outcomes and carefully matches the particular needs of the 
youth and family to the appropriate intervention strategy.
For online information and assistance on detention reform, visit: www.jdaihelpdesk.org
To learn more about the work and research of the Justice Policy Institute, visit:
www.justicepolicy.org.
In the counties 
implementing JDAI, 
juvenile crime rates 
fell as much as, or 
more than the national 
decreases in juvenile 
crime.
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